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BOOK REVIEW
CORPORATE CRIM UNDER ATTACK. Written by Francis T. Cullen,
William J. Maakestad and Gray Cavender. Anderson Publishing
Co., 1987. Pp. 398 (paperback).
Reviewed By
D. Christopher Wells*
In the late afternoon of August 10, 1978, Judy Ulrich was driving
her sister Lyn and their cousin Donna along State Highway 33 to-
ward Goshen, Indiana. On this clear, mildly warm summer day, the
three girls were heading to a church volleyball game. Judy pulled
her subcompact car into a self-service gas station to fill up; whoever
pumped the gas left the gas cap sitting on the roof of the car. A
few minutes down the road, the gas cap rolled off the roof and
across the five-lane highway: On the almost deserted road Judy eas-
ily made a big U-turn and pulled over near the gas cap, but she
was unable to pull her car off the roadway because of its eight-inch
curbs. Judy stopped her car in the outermost lane and put the emer-
gency flashers on. Donna, in the passenger seat, opened her door
to get out and retrieve the gas cap.
At that moment, a Chevy van travelling at or near the 55-mph
speed limit smashed squarely into the back of the girls' car. The
impact was sufficient to rocket the small car down the roadway,
turn it around, and jump it over the eight-inch curb. The van crushed
the car's rear bumper up to just behind the driver's seat; the back
end of the car was gone. The car's gas tank, located just ahead of
the rear bumper, burst, and the car went up in flames. Lyn and
Donna perished horribly in the fire; Judy, burned over most of her
body, lived only for a few hours. The three girls had been riding
in a 1973 Pinto sedan.1
* Associate Professor of Law, West Virginia University; B.A., 1971, Grinnell College; J.D.,
1978, University of Iowa.
1. F. CULLEN, W. MAAKEsTAD & G. CAVENDER, CoRPoRATE CRIME UNDER ATTACK 170 (1987).
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One month later, Michael Cosentino, the Elkhart (Indiana)
County prosecutor, sought and obtained the indictment of Ford Mo-
tor Company for the reckless homicide of the three girls. 2 Now, nine
years after the tragedy on Highway 33, the prosecutor's half brother
and two co-authors have undertaken to explain the genesis of that
criminal prosecution and to place it in a larger social, historical,
and legal context.3 Their book, Corporate Crime Under Attack, not
only addresses the societal context for the indictment, but extensively
describes many of the fascinating pretrial and trial events upon which
success and failure hung. The book concludes with some brief ob-
servations about the importance of the prosecution as a precedent
for further assaults on corporate crime. As one who helped to defend
Ford Motor Company in that prosecution, I must commend the
three authors for writing the most comprehensive of the Ford crim-
inal prosecution accounts to date.4 The book is not without serious
flaws, but even so it presents an eminently readable, intriguing sum-
mary of what was then an unprecedented indictment and criminal
prosecution.
Perhaps the book's greatest success is its explanation of why the
rural county prosecutor sought to blame the deaths of these three
girls on Ford Motor Company, rather than on the driver of the van,
on those who allowed the driver behind the wheel, or even on the
designers of the curbed road. That explanation requires most of the
book's nearly 400 pages. The three authors inquire into the personal
motivations of the prosecutor and his staff; into the influences upon
the prosecutor of outsiders interested for one reason or another in
a Ford conviction; into recently developed social and psychological
attitudes toward "corporate lawlessness"; into the progress of the
criminal law as it applies to corporations and other "elites"; and,
of course, into the history of the Pinto automobile itself.
The question "Why blame Ford?" has always been easy to an-
swer by those whose only information came from the sketchy, se-
2. Id. at 146.
3. Id. at x-xi.
4. The other significant book about the Ford Pinto criminal prosecution is Reckless Homicide?
by Lee Patrick Strobel (And Books 1980). Mr. Strobel's account is more journalistic, focusing largely
on the personalities who participated in the trial.
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lective (and often inaccurate) news reports about the Pinto and fuel-
tank fires. But the question has tended to baffle many of those
persons who know the most about the facts of the Ulrich accident,
about Ford Motor Company, and about the design and features of
the Pinto. That small group eventually came to include the Win-
amac, Indiana, jurors who judged Ford's conduct in this prose-
cution. It was Prosecutor Michael Cosentino's failure to disabuse
the jurors of their puzzlement about the criminal prosecution that
led to Ford's successful defense and acquittal.
Why were those closest to the facts baffled? Is the question "Why
blame Ford?" really so difficult? Let's look at two principal points
raised by the book. First, one could make a very good case for
placing blame on persons other than Ford, particularly the driver
of the van or of those who allowed him on the road in August 1987.
For example, the prosecutor's investigation revealed overwhelming
evidence of recklessness on the part of the van's driver.
The young man driving the Chevy van had a lamentable driving
record of carelessness and flouting the law. His very brief driving
history included three prior personal injury accidents, citations for
failure to yield and for running a stop sign, two prior speeding
convictions for driving twenty miles per hour over the posted limits,
two license suspensions, and a citation for driving without a license
while under suspension. His more recent suspension had been lifted
exactly one month before he crashed into the Ulrich's Pinto.5
The police search of the van turned up pills in the ashtray, partly
empty beer bottles, a bag of marijuana and rolling papers. (He was
charged with possessing amphetamines, a charge that was later
dropped. No other charges were filed.) 6
The young driver admittedly made no attempt to brake, stop,
or turn his van before the impact. In fact, he did not even see the
girls' car until just at the moment of impact. His reason: he was
looking around on the floor of his van for something to smoke. 7
5. Id. at 146. Some of this information derives from the driving offense "rap sheet" released
to Ford Motor Company's lawyers by the prosecutor prior to trial pursuant to a Brady request.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 170.
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If one were to focus on "but for" causes of the accident, the
state and its highway design could also share the blame. After all,
the roadway, with its eight-inch curbs, was known to be hazardous
and of poor design. The curbs prevented disabled vehicles from get-
ting out of harm's way. They clearly prevented Judy Ulrich from
pulling her car off the road. In fact, the grand jury that indicted
Ford recommended that the curbs be removed; about ten months
after the accident they were. 8 Had the state spent the money to
remove them when it first recognized their danger, the three girls
might be alive today.
Second, although the popular press tended to downplay or over-
look these facts, the prosecutor knew or could have discovered prior
to the indictment a number of facts tending to exonerate Ford. The
facts eventually formed the core of Ford's successful defense of the
case: 1. The 1973 Pinto met every governmental fuel-safety stan-
dard.9 2. Ford was the only automaker to have an internal company
standard requiring fuel-system integrity for a rear-end collision for
1973 cars, and it tested its cars to make sure they met the standard. 0
3. As even the prosecution's own expert acknowledged, the Pinto
fuel-tank placement and design was like "95 / of all American cars."
11 4. A rear-end collision like that in the Ulrich accident involving
a two-ton van with an I-beam frame would have caused a fuel tank
rupture in virtually any car with the fuel tank in the rear. Crash
tests (that the prosecutor sought to exclude) confirmed that a Dodge
Colt, a Chevy Vega, a Toyota Corolla, an AMC Gremlin and even
one of the largest of American passenger cars-the Chevrolet Im-
pala-would have suffered the same fate in the Ulrich collision.' 2
8. Id. at 178.
9. Id. at 267.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 271. One of the principal rationales for putting fuel tanks in the rear of cars is that
relatively few collisions are rear-enders. Most collisions involve the front end and many of those are
higher speed. For that reason, the cars with the greatest likelihood of fuel tank leaks and fires in
collisions are those with front gas tanks, such as the VW Bug or Porsche. Placement of the tank
toward the center of the car, particularly a small car, means that rear seat passengers would virtually
be sitting on the gas tank. In the late 1960's, at the time the Pinto was on the drawing board, these
considerations seemed to make engineers reluctant to move the tank away from the rear in their
designs.
12. Id. at 284-85.
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5. Even had the Ulrich car's fuel tank been fitted with the filler-
pipe "fix" that was available and that Ford was accused of recklessly
omitting, it could not have withstood the impact of the magnitude
(50 mph or greater) of this crash.13 6. The very Ford engineers and
executives whom the prosecutor accused of recklessly designing and
selling Pinto sedans used them for their own family vehicles. 14 7.
Government data showed that the Pinto sedan was no more likely
than other subcompact cars to suffer from fuel-tank fires. 15
The authors of this book begin their assessment of Cosentino's
motivations for blaming Ford with a sociological study of societal
response to crisis. They posit the existence of widespread corporate
"lawlessness," both criminal and civil, in the United States. In their
view, only in the last decade or two has our society developed a
genuine concern for corporate wrongdoing and white-collar crime
such that we are willing to take it on-legislatively and judicially-
especially in criminal, as opposed to civil, actions. In sociological
terms (one of the authors is a sociologist), society's concern recently
has ripened into a "movement" to regulate and control crimes per-
13. The actual closing speed of the van and the Pinto (the difference between their two velocities)
was perhaps the most crucial fact necessary to both the prosecution and the defense. The prosecutor
had estimated it to be no more than 30-35 mph. He believed, particularly after he conferred with
the leaders of the anti-Pinto "crusade" (see infra text accompanying notes 18 - 22) that it was reckless
for Ford to have sold and not repaired a vehicle that would not withstand an impact of that magnitude
without a fuel-tank leak. On the other hand, if the closing speed were above 40 or 50 mph, it would
be difficult if not impossible to prove that the Pinto design, rather than the impact itself, caused the
deaths. For his estimate of the Pinto's speed, the prosecutor relied on several eyewitnesses who were
travelling from the opposite direction on Highway 33, who believed that the Pinto was moving when
struck from behind. For his estimate of the van's speed, Cosentino relied on the word of the van's
driver that he was travelling at less than the 55-mph speed limit. Id. at 269-70, 280-92.
If the prosecutor had conducted a fuller investigation, he would presumably have interviewed
two of the hospital personnel - a nurse and an orderly-who had talked to Judy Ulrich after the
crash. Judy told them not only that she had stopped her Pinto and put on her flashers, but why:
she had to retrieve the gas cap. Ford's own investigation of the crash turned up these witnesses only
after the trial had started. Their testimony also solved several related mysteries that the prosecutor
had not: why the gas cap was lying in the road, why the Pinto's passenger door was open and why
the girls' car was heading away from their known destination when struck. Id. at 276-77, 286-87.
The prosecution team's response to this testimony was to seek to exclude it, asserting an objection
based on the "Indiana Dead Man's Statute." Obviously the team meant the dying-declaration ex-
ception to the hearsay rule. Had they made the proper objection, the Court might have had to exclude
the testimony. It was hearsay, and Judy may not have apprehended her imminent death. She had
been told by a physician that she would be all right.
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petrated by elite groups. This includes both a "revitalization move-
ment" among prosecutors and criminologists toward the ideals of
their respective professions and a "symbolic movement" led by gov-
ernment and interest groups to demonstrate that all persons-weak
and powerful-are equal before the law.16 These movements "trans-
formed both Americans' views of corporations and the government's
possible reactions to the conduct of big business' '1 7 and they pre-
pared "many people across the nation ... to believe that Ford had
sacrificed safety in pursuit of profits. 18 In a general way, then, the
book demonstrates that by the late 1970's, these movements had
created a psychological environment that not only allowed, but en-
couraged, prosecutors and others to charge large corporations with
all manner of wrongdoing. The authors then focus on Ford Motor
Company and the Pinto sedan and address the more specific ques-
tion of how Prosecutor Cosentino was induced in this environment
to blame Ford for these particular deaths.
Given that one of their number had assisted Cosentino in the
prosecution against Ford, the authors' decision to focus on the pro-
duction of the Pinto and the Indiana prosecution as paradigmatic
of corporate lawlessness and of the social movements they describe
yielded a significant benefit. Through one of their own, the authors
had access to "inside" information about the personal motivations
of the prosecutor, increasing the reliability of their account because
much of the information had come directly from Cosentino at the
time of the actual events. This inside information serves to confirm
their thesis that Prosecutor Cosentino's decision to blame Ford was
not merely induced by, but perhaps even made by, external forces,
by influences quite apart from an independent analysis of facts and
law.
The authors describe Cosentino's reaction to the girls' deaths as
one of moral outrage spurred by a conviction that Ford had decided
"to sacrifice human life for private profit." 19 Interestingly, this con-
16. Id. at 16-22.
17. Id. at 147.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 148.
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viction arose from the fact that one of his investigators shortly be-
fore the accident had read an article entitled "Pinto Madness" in
a magazine called Mother Jones. The investigator remembered the
article and told Cosentino about it. The assertions in that article-
essentially that Ford executives and engineers had decided to put
profit before safety-thereafter provided Cosentino and his prose-
cutorial team a lens through which the facts of the case would focus:
"Even today [investigator] Graves cannot say how much that article
shaped his investigation of the accident." 20 The author of that article
put Prosecutor Cosentino in touch with others who then enlisted
Cosentino and Graves as part of a "network of people who were
crusading against the Pinto." 2' Plaintiffs' lawyers who would benefit
from the precedent of a criminal conviction of Ford suggested expert
witnesses and contributed information, theories, and help. From their
contributions of documents, Cosentino's office turned into a
" 'clearinghouse' for Pinto documents.'"' These plaintiffs' lawyers
and media contacts "sensitized Cosentino to a way of thinking about
the accident.' '23 In fact, according to these authors, it was only after
being so sensitized and being persuaded to join the "crusade" that
the prosecution team began to gather, examine, and evaluate the
accident-site evidence. In short, Cosentino had his suspect; all he
needed to do was to try to prove that a crime had been committed.
Another element that warmed Cosentino to the Ford challenge
was what the authors refer to as the "David and Goliath" factor,
with Cosentino cast in the role of David against the behemoth Phil-
istine, Ford Motor Company. At first, taking on the huge corpo-
ration had a romantic aura; Cosentino liked the idea of "embarking
on an adventure." 24 A visit by three in-house Ford lawyers solidified
Cosentino's resolve:
By the time the Ford lawyers came to dissuade him from pursuing a grand-jury
investigation, Mike Cosentino, the epitome of the "American dream," had be-
come a successful man. His civil practice was flourishing; he was a popular elected
20. Id. at 172.
21. Id. at 173.
22. Id. at 174.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 148.
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official. He was also known for his intense, flamboyant courtroom manner. Com-
petitive by nature, he was proud that he had tried twenty-five homicide cases and
had won a conviction in every instance. He was not pleased to be told by "slick"
corporate lawyers that he didn't know what he was doing. After all, who the
hell did Ford and its lawyers think they were dealing with?2
But soon the reality of going up against equal or better competition
began to seep in. As the book observes, Cosentino was used to
prosecuting the indigent and the helpless, those who are outclassed
in almost every way by the forces of the State: in budget, in staff,
in support services, in investigative capacity, with crime laboratories,
with witnesses and by public sentiment.26 In this case, Cosentino
would still have most of those advantages, 27 plus a special county
stipend, free use of state planes, helicopters, and crime lab and the
backing of the federal government document archives. He was also
able to assemble a team of private and public lawyers and law stu-
dents who donated much of their time. Despite his creation of per-
haps the most talented, hard-working, and well-supported prosecution
team of his career, Cosentino still felt he was the underdog in this
prosecution. Not one to shirk a challenge, in fact one who was
enlivened by one, Cosentino forged ahead with the prosecution.
One of the strongest sections of the book is its treatment of the
prosecution itself, from the indictment through the pretrial and trial
events, particularly the development and resolution of the many and
varied legal issues. Lawyer and layperson alike can enjoy and learn
from the necessarily simplified descriptions of the legal history, con-
stitutional law, and regulatory issues that formed the core of the
legal, as opposed to factual, battle of the prosecution. As the authors
25. Id. at 177.
26. Id. at 193.
27. It appeared to me that Cosentino rather quickly lost the advantage of local public sentiment,
for several reasons. First, a change of venue moved the trial from his own Elkhart County down to
the Pulaski County seat of Winamac, where he was not well known. Second, most of the Ford defense
team took up semi-permanent residence in Winamac apartments and became a part of the community,
even to the point of being invited into people's homes for dinner and bowling on the weekends at
the local lanes. Cosentino's team lived out of town and made appearances only on trial days. In
effect, Cosentino and his team became the outsiders. Third, although the book describes Cosentino
as driving his Chevrolet Blazer to court each day, my few recollections involve Cosentino, wearing
his usual black hat, black overcoat and scowl, driving into town in a long motorcade of police cars.
Lead defense counsel, Jim Neal, in particular, presented the townspeople and the jury a striking
contrast of geniality and approachability.
[Vol. 901286
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show, this trial taxed the legal and financial resources of both sides.
On this element of their account, the authors earn their royalties.
The book, however, does disappoint in several respects. First, it
is flawed by an understandable but unscientific and unacademic bias.
It is understandable that a brother of the prosecutor (and a pros-
ecution team member himself) would weigh in most heavily with the
prosecution's views of the facts, law, and personalities involved in
the case. The authors recognize the problem of bias in their preface.
To be sure, one author's inside role allowed access to information-
particularly as to the prosecutor's motivations-that was uniquely
revealing. But a book that purports to be academic, written by three
professional academicians, who assert they will let the facts speak
for themselves, should endeavor more seriously to discover and learn
from other viewpoints and sources of information. Little, if any,
of their story draws upon community sources, trial witnesses, trial
transcript, government sources, defense team members, or Ford Mo-
tor Company. It is not as if they fail to acknowledge and often
lucidly explain defense points; rather, just as they reveal Cosentino's
focus on the Ulrich accident to have been the product of a lens
crafted by others, so do they reveal that their own interpretations
are the product of their close ties to the prosecution.
One example of this is their discussion of Ford crash tests of
prototype and early Pintos and of Ford's discussions with the Na-
tional Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) about fed-
eral crashworthiness standards. The authors reconstruct and portray
these events, as they acknowledge in a footnote, from one prose-
cutor's contemporaneous, written trial theories about those events
and from a 1986 telephone conversation that elicited that former
prosecutor's "best recollections" of the events. 28 Put another way,
for their characterizations of the facts and meaning of these tests
and discussions, they rely almost exclusively on one whose job it
was to paint the events in their worst light.
Another disappointment is that the authors fail to take on di-
rectly the very sticky issue of how a corporation or any organization
28. Id. at 258-60, 301 n.29.
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should make rational decisions, particularly where there is the pos-
sibility of criminal prosecution for a wrong decision. On this issue,
their treatment of cost-benefit analysis reveals with irony the dif-
ficulty of the task. As the authors report, the "Pinto Madness"
article in Mother Jones and its author eventually persuaded Cos-
entino to charge Ford in the deaths of the Ulrich girls. The heart
of that article was its author's allegation that Ford had used a cost:
benefit analysis to conclude that it was economically irrational to
fix or recall Pinto sedans. In this alleged cost-benefit appraisal, Ford
was widely accused of two wrongs: putting a dollar value on a hu-
man life or serious injury; and comparing that loss of life or injury
to the costs of improving the Pinto fuel tank. The fact is that Ford
did not do this.29 Nonetheless, it goes without saying that manu-
facturers of products do compare the costs of possible changes or
improvements in their product designs with the benefits that will
result from the changes. When it comes to safety questions, mea-
surements of costs and benefits are particularly difficult, as are the
decisions about whether to implement the proposed improvements.
To take a current example, one might wonder whether all cars sold
today should include as standard features (or at least as available
options) state-of-the-art technologies that enhance safety, such as air
bags, computerized braking systems, automatic window de-icers, and
body designs and materials that will absorb high-speed collision en-
ergy to protect passengers. What about plastic fuel tank bladders,
even if the owner will have to have them replaced annually at sig-
nificant expense because of gasoline-caused deterioration? And given
their inherent disadvantages in collisions with larger, heavier vehi-
cles, should we allow manufacturers even to sell subcompact cars
(not to say motorcycles and bicycles)? Who-manufacturers, con-
29. Id. at 162. The document reproduced in the book and cited by the Mother Jones article
as evidence of Ford's cost-benefit analysis was prepared by Ford economists (not engineers) at the
request of the federal government. The federal government, notFord, provided the valuations of a
human life and serious burn injuries that the analysis was to use. In fact, the authors went so far
as to dispute the federal government's assumptions. Even so, the document itself pertained neither
to the Pinto nor to rear-end fuel tank fires. Rather, it addressed the issue of some 12.5 million
hypothetical small cars and trucks and the effectiveness of a proposed government regulation about
rollover accidents, not rear-end collisions. The fact that the document had literally nothing to do
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sumers or governmental agencies-should decide these questions?
And should we countenance the use of cost-benefit analysis-par-
ticularly the economists who would place some dollar value on hu-
man life and health-in making such decisions?
The great irony in this book is that while decrying the use of
cost-benefit calculations by corporate decision makers and suggesting
anyone who would do so is heartless, the authors use it repeatedly
to justify and explain the actions of other participants in their ac-
count, particularly prosecutors. For example, Prosecutor Cosentino
employed a cost-benefit calculation to determine the size and nature
of his prosecutorial team, deciding to refuse many offers of help
he received from law professors around the country.30 Similarly, say
the authors, plaintiff's lawyers regularly decide whether to take cases
against manufacturers by comparing the estimated costs of discovery
(and, presumably, litigation) to the potential returns for them and
their clients from the litigation." This rule applies in general to pro-
secutors also. They, according to the authors, because of limited
resources, are required to "compute the utilitarian value" of pros-
ecuting some cases because of the costs associated with foregoing
others.12 That is so even where a decision not to prosecute may leave
criminals on the street (or in the suites) and cost citizens their lives
or health.
The problems with superficial examination of cost-benefit anal-
yses, which admittedly have serious weakness in some applications,
are symptomatic of the extension of criminal law to product liability
kinds of problems. To the book's credit, the authors include Ford
defense counsel Malcolm Wheeler's reported comments on the gen-
eral issue, particularly whether product safety standards are better
addressed by regulatory and legislative bodies or by lay juries in
criminal prosecutions. 33 Unfortunately, the book does not answer
adequately Wheeler's implicit assertion that even successful criminal
prosecutions, particularly those brought on recklessness theories, may
30. Id. at 195.
31. Id. at 198.
32. Id. at 328.
33. Id. at 248-50.
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be insufficiently clear in their message about what constitutes non-
criminal behavior to be useful either to corporations or society as
a whole. Convicted individuals are often imprisoned so that they
will not be able to repeat their crimes, the nature of which are
usually spelled out clearly in an indictment. Criminal law has no
such sanction for corporations, and the message to them is little
more than, "go forth and build a 'better' product." Simply put,
prosecutors and juries are often not the best sources of safety leg-
islation.
12
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